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INTRODUCTION
In a free market economy, abusive business practices are kept
in check by the forces of free competition. Recognizing free competi-
tion as a national policy, Congress has enacted antitrust laws in an
effort to preserve free competition and its prophylactic effect.' On
the other hand, in dealing with certain industries, Congress has
implicitly recognized that unlimited free competition is either impos-
sible or undesirable, by enacting specialized regulatory legislation 2
' 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970) designates as part of the "antitrust laws" the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970); parts of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8 et seq. (1970); and
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1970).
In addition to those provisions, which are formally designated "antitrust laws," other
provisions also serve the function of preserving free competition. For example, § 3 of the
Robinson-Patman. Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1970), prohibits predatory pricing practices, though
technically it is not a part of the antitrust laws. See Maclntyre Volhard, Predatory Pricing
Legislation—Is It Necessary?, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1972). Although this
comment is directed at the applicability of the antitrust laws to regulated industries, the
arguments and rationales for antitrust exceptions apply equally to other enactments, such as §
3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibit activities within the scope of regulation under
the regulatory act,
2 See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970); Shipping Act of
1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970); Federal Aviation Act, 49 U,S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970).
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to encourage development in the chosen industries while affording
protection from abusive practices through a specialized regulatory
scheme. Because the goals of these specialized regulatory schemes
often differ from the ultimate antitrust goal of free competition, the
applicability of the antitrust laws to industries subject to regulatory
legislation is questionable. 3 In particular, the recurrent question
which has persistently plagued antitrust litigants and courts is the
extent to which the prohibitions of the antitrust laws apply to those
engaged in industries subject to a specialized regulatory scheme.
This comment will examine the broad question of antitrust
immunity of regulated industries. Specifically, it will attempt to
describe the different arguments which can be made in asserting an
exception from the scope of the antitrust laws. In so doing, it will
first describe the main issues arising in the area of expressly-stated
exceptions from the antitrust laws. The comment will next describe
the arguments available to litigants urging an implied exception to
the operation of the antitrust laws by virtue of regulatory enact-
ments and their regulatory mechanisms, comprising the arguments
derived from pervasive regulation, primary jurisdiction, prior ap-
proval immunity, and self-regulatory justification as enunciated in
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange. 4 This description will attempt
to distinguish the four different types of implied exceptions, and, in
each case, to trace the development of its underlying rationale. The
comment will then discuss the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and
attempt to resolve the current confusion in the law by distinguishing
its use as an implied antitrust exception argument from its use as a
means of allocating particular questions to the proper adjudicatory
body. Toward this end, the circumstances surrounding the latter use
of the doctrine will be explored and an underlying rationale will be
proposed. Finally, the comment will analyze the recent Supreme
Court decisions in the area, including Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, 5 Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 6 and
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States.' This analysis will lead to
the submission that the Court has failed to clarify the principles of
regulatory-antitrust accommodation. More specifically, it will be
asserted that the Court did not correctly consider the different
antitrust exception arguments, that it invoked arguably inapplicable
antitrust exceptions, that it failed to take cognizance of others which
See Mitchell, Primary Jurisdiction: What It is and What It Is Not, 13 ABA Antitrust
Section 26, 36 (1958). One text has noted:
It is generally recognized that the ultimate goal of free competition envisioned
by the antitrust statutes may differ markedly from the goal of Congress in requiring
that activities of a specific industry be regulated in the 'public interest', competition
and other factors considered.
S. Oppenheim & G. Weston, Federal Antitrust Laws 39 (3d ed. 1968).
373 U.S. 341 (1963).
3 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
6 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
7 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
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were more properly applicable, and that it frequently examined
irrelevant criteria in evaluating antitrust exception claims. It will
further be submitted that the Court improperly invoked the function
of primary jurisdiction which results in administrative agency refer-
ral. For these reasons it will be concluded that the coordination of
regulatory and antitrust law remains in need of further judicial
clarification.
I. ANTITRUST EXCEPTION ARGUMENTS
A. Express Exceptions
Many express exceptions from the operation of the antitrust
laws have been enacted by Congress. 8 For example, certain labor
organizations are expressly excepted from the antitrust laws by a
provision of the Clayton Act. 9
 Otherwise, express exceptions from
the antitrust laws can sometimes be found in the regulatory acts."
When an express exception argument is raised, the main issues
concern the prerequisites and scope of the particular exception.
Such exception provisions are interpreted narrowly, both in
terms of fulfilling the requirements for their application and of
defining the scope of their operation. This restrictive treatment of
express exceptions reflects the view that repeal of the antitrust laws
should not be lightly assumed. By both requiring strict compliance
with the prerequisites of the Agricultural Adjustment Act" and
limiting the scope of immunity conferred by the Capper-Volstead
Act, 12
 the Supreme Court in United States v. Borden" implicitly
established the proposition that express exceptions should be nar-
rowly construed so as to give maximum effect to the operation of the
antitrust laws. Similarly, in Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound
Conference," the Court disallowed asserted immunity, finding that
the prerequisites of the express exception contained in section 15 of
the Shipping Act" had not been met. 16 In sum, it is apparent that
express exceptions have been applied only when their conditions
have been fulfilled, and even then the scope of immunity conferred
by the enactments has been narrowly viewed.
For an examination of such express exceptions, often referred to as "exemptions," see
33 ABA Antitrust L.J. 1 (1967).
9
 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
1 ° See, e.g., the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. §1828(c) (1970), and the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608b (1970).
11
 7 U.S.C. § 608b (1970).
12
 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1970).
13
 308 U.S. 188, 201, 204-05 (1939). The Borden Court also considered an implied
antitrust exception claim. See text at note 25 infra.
' 4 383 U.S. 213 (1966),
' 5
 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
lb
 383 U.S. at 216-17. After determining that the express exception did not apply, the
Court also considered defendant's claim of an implied exception. See notes 36-37 infra.
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B. Implied Exceptions
If an express exception is not applicable, defendants subject to
regulation under a regulatory scheme still have several arguments
available to avoid liability under the antitrust laws. Several implied
arguments have been fashioned from the coexistence of regulatory
and antitrust enactments. Certain factors, however, may preclude
such an argument. In at least one case, a clear expression of legisla-
tive intent to the contrary prevented an implied antitrust exception
argument. 17
 In other cases," an aversion to the implicit repeal of
the antitrust laws has led to the denial of implied antitrust exception
arguments."' However, in the absence of a clearly stated contrary
legislative intent, the principle of avoiding the implicit repeal of the
antitrust laws has been overcome by claims of implied antitrust
exceptions wrought from regulatory act policy justifications. Four
different forms of implied antitrust immunity have been asserted. 2 °
1. Pervasive Regulation
The first implied exception argument—pervasive regulation
—arises from the claim that the regulatory acts so thoroughly regu-
late the involved industry that there is no scope of operation for the
antitrust laws. 21
 The argument has never been successfully invoked.
In United States v. Trans
-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 22 decided in 1897,
the Supreme Court refused to hold that Interstate Commerce Act23
regulation of the railroad industry was so pervasive as to impliedly
except the industry from the operation of the antitrust laws. 24 The
Court reached a similar result as to the agricultural industry in
United States v. Borden. 25
17
 United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S.334 (1958). For further discussion
of this decision, see note 49 infra. In other cases the presence of a "savings clause" providing
that existing statutory and common law remedies should remain intact may preclude an
implied antitrust exception argument. See Note, Antitrust and the Regulated Industries: The
Panagra Decision and Its Ramifications, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 593, 597-98 (1963).
'" See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963); United
States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
19
 It has been stated that "repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory
statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy
between the antitrust laws and the regulatory provisions." Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
at 350-51 (footnotes omitted).
Nomenclature for the different implied exception arguments has not always been
consistent. See note 35 infra and accompanying text. This comment therefore identifies the
different arguments by the substance of their claim for immunity, and adopts descriptive
names for each different argument.
21
 See Comment, An Approach for Reconciling Antitrust Law and Securities Law: The
Antitrust Immunity of the Securities Industry Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L, Rev. 260, 314
(1970).
22
 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
23 Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1897), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (1970).
24 166 U.S. at 316,
25
 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939). For a discussion , of the Borden Court's treatment of express
exceptions, see text at note 13 supra.
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Since the Borden decision, the Court has considered the perva-
sive regulation argument several times, yet has failed to find even
one regulatory 'act so pervasive as to repeal by implication the
antitrust laws. 26
 The argument has been asserted so many times and
has met with such hostile reception that it has been suggested that
no regulatory scheme exists that is so pervasive as to repeal by
implication the antitrust laws. 27
2. Controversy Primary Jurisdiction
Another argument which has been made by litigants urging an
implied exception to the antitrust laws may be called "controversy
primary jurisdiction."28
 This argument has been raised when the
remedial provisions of a regulatory act have afforded an injured
party the same type of relief obtainable under the antitrust laws. 29
In such cases, when certain other conditions have been met," the
26
 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 352 (1963); Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 296, 311-12 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962); United
States v, Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 351 (1959).
27
 Note, The New York Stock Exchange Minimum Rate Structure: Antitrust on Wall
Street, 55 Va. L. Rev. 661, 671 n.76 (1969). But see Comment, An Approach for Reconciling
Antitrust and Securities Law: The Antitrust immunity of the Securities Industry Reconsi-
dered, 65 Nw. U.L. Rev. 260, 314 (1970).
2 ' This comment adopts the word "controversy" in referring to the primary jurisdiction
implied exception argument to help clearly distinguish the different functions which the term
"primary jurisdiction" has served. The other use to which the term "primary jurisdiction" has
been put is described in the text following note 66 infra.
As an implied antitrust exception argument, primary jurisdiction has been invoked in
cases in which a regulatory remedy has afforded the antitrust plaintiff the right to seek similar
relief in an administrative proceeding. In such cases, the entire controversy (which may be
defined as a claim for relief) has been removed from the antitrust court to the regulatory
administration for determination.
29
 See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966); Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc. v, United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S.
482 (1962); Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); United States
Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932); Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 260
U.S. 156 (1922).
3°
 In early cases, the dismissal of antitrust claims was ordered when there was both an
available regulatory remedy which would afford relief similar to that sought under the
antitrust laws and a policy reason—such as uniformity of damage awards or the need for
administrative expertise—which was found to be compelling. See, e.g., Far East, 342 U.S. at
570; Cunard, 284 U.S. at 485; Keogh, 260 U.S. at 162-63. The rationale for these decisions
evolved from two earlier cases in which plaintiffs sought relief under a common law theory of
recovery notwithstanding available administrative remedies. See Great N. Ry. v. Merchants
Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426
(1907).
In later cases, the Court has dismissed antitrust claims upon an additional finding that
similar administrative remedies were available and that the administrative agency needed to
consider the identical standards that an antitrust court would use in determining whether to
grant relief. See Pan Am, 371 U.S. at 305; California, 369 U.S. at 485. The test employed in
these later cases will be identified as the "identical standard" test. See text at note 47 infra. It
will be submitted that it is improper either to search for a compelling policy reason to invoke
controversy primary jurisdiction or to inquire whether the regulatory agency employs the
identical standard as an antitrust court. See text at note 48 infra.
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Supreme Court has ordered the antitrust action dismissed, and has
thus suggested a second implied antitrust exception—that the similar
administrative remedies made available to the antitrust plaintiff
supersede those provided by the antitrust law. 3 '
Controversy primary jurisdiction differs from pervasive regula-
tion. While the latter presents the contention that the enactment of
the regulatory act entirely displaces the operation of the antitrust
laws on the regulated industry, the operation of controversy primary
jurisdiction suggests a pro tanto repeal: i.e., to the extent that the
regulatory act provides an antitrust plaintiff with a remedy similar
to that available under the antitrust laws, the antitrust remedy will
be considered repealed." Beyond the scope of asserted immunity,
another distinction exists between controversy primary jurisdiction
and pervasive regulation. Since controversy primary jurisdiction
depends on the availability of an administrative remedy, it is applic-
able only where the regulatory enactment provides such a remedy.
On the other hand, pervasive regulation can be asserted even where
Although the Supreme Court has frequently ordered dismissal of the antitrust case
whenever similar available regulatory remedies have been present, it has suggested that a
delay of the antitrust proceedings might also be appropriate. See note 37 infra and accom-
panying text. It will be submitted that the correct disposition when controversy primary
jurisdiction is invoked is the dismissal of the antitrust action, under the theory that available
administrative remedies replace, rather than supplement, similar remedies sought under the
antitrust laws. See text at note 45 infra.
It is important to note that dismissal of a claim under controversy primary jurisdiction
grounds need not always terminate an antitrust suit. If the antitrust suit consists of several
claims for relief, only those claims for which similar remedial action is available through the
regulatory apparatus will be displaced. Under controversy primary jurisdiction, not every
claim for relief in a given case is necessarily transferred to the regulatory body for adjudica-
tion, although each claim for relief (controversy) which is so transferred is completely adjudi-
cated therein. Once transferred, the antitrust court plays no part in determining the con-
troversy so referred, except to the extent that it might be called upon to exercise judicial
review of the regulatory body's decision. The role of the referring court is like that of an
appellate court, and the process of judicial review is limited to inquiring whether any
substantial evidence exists in support of the agency's decision, or whether the agency exceeded
statutory or constitutional boundaries. See ICC v. Atlantic Coast Lines, 383 U.S. 576, 594
(1966); cf. 5 U.S.C. §§ 703, 706 (1970).
32 Several cases in which the controversy primary. jurisdiction argument has been suc-
cessfully. employed have been very careful to note that the decision did not find that the
operation of the antitrust laws was completely ousted by the regulatory scheme. See, e.g., Pan
Ant, 371 U.S. at 305; Cunard, 284 U.S. at 485. Moreover, in Keogh, 260 U.S. at 162, the Court
invoked controversy primary jurisdiction, finding that the remedial procedures available
under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9, 16 (1970), operated to the exclusion of
similar antitrust remedies, although a prior decision, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S, 290 (1897), had found that the Interstate Commerce Act did not consist of
such pervasive regulation as to completely displace the operation of the antitrust laws. The
Trans-Missouri decision is discussed in the text at note 22 supra.
Despite this significant distinction between pervasive regulation and controversy primary
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has used the term "pervasive regulation" to refer to primary
jurisdiction arguments. See note 35 infra. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has spoken of a
"pervasive regulatory scheme" when considering in substance a controversy primary jurisdic-
tion claim. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 336 F.2d 650, 651, 662-63,
666-67 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
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the administrative agency established by the regulatory act has no
power to review the activities complained of. 33
Unfortunately, the controversy primary jurisdiction argument
has never been clarified by the Supreme Court. Though the Court
has ordered dismissal of antitrust claims in order to permit adminis-
trative proceedings in which similar relief would be sought, 34
 it has
done so with little consistency. At times, the Court has used differ-
ent nomenclature when referring to the controversy primary juris-
diction argument. 35
 In one case in which the regulatory act provided
remedies similar to those under the antitrust laws, 36
 the Court
concluded that the antitrust proceedings remained available, thus
suggesting that regulatory remedies supplemented rather than re-
placed similar antitrust remedies. 37
 In addition, the Court has fre-
quently invoked without explanation different tests in considering
claims for exception from the antitrust laws. 38
These three areas of inconsistency associated with the con-
troversy primary jurisdiction doctrine are nevertheless capable of
resolution. As far as the problem of varying nomenclature is con-
cerned, one need only ignore the various labels which courts have
assigned to the implied antitrust exception argument involving simi-
lar regulatory and antitrust remedies. By focusing on its substance,
the controversy primary jurisdiction claim can be readily identified.
The dispute over the appropriate function of controversy pri-
mary jurisdiction can also be resolved. An examination of the policy
consequences of both the supplementary and replacement functions
33 See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
34 See, e.g., cases cited in note 30 supra.
35
 In some cases, the Supreme Court has used no label when referring to a controversy
primary jurisdiction claim. See Pan Am, 371 U.S. at 309; Keogh, 260 U.S. at 162. In at least
one other decision the Court used the phrase "primary jurisdiction." Carnation, 383 U.S. at
220. Different terms have also been used. In California, 369 U.S. at 485, the Court found that
an antitrust action should proceed, and implicitly was not replaced by regulatory remedies
because the regulation was not "pervasive."
Finally, the term "exclusive preliminary jurisdiction" has been employed in reference to
controversy primary jurisdiction claims. Far East, 342 U.S. at 574; Cunard, 284 U.S. at 485.
This term is technically inaccurate. "Exclusive" incorrectly infers that any decision reached by
an administrative agency in the course of regulatory act remedial proceedings would be
insulated from judicial review. See Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481,
498 (1968), in which the Court held that the Cunard holding did not result in giving the
regulatory agency free rein to interpret the regulatory act as it saw fit. "Preliminary" is also
deceptive, as it incorrectly infers that a court, in dismissing an antitrust suit remanding the
plaintiff to available regulatory act remedies, somehow retains "subsequent" jurisdiction. It
will be submitted that regulatory remedies replace similar antitrust remedies, and therefore
that dismissal of the antitrust claim is appropriate. See text at note 45 infra. It should be
noted, however, that the inference of "subsequent" jurisdiction is appropriate to the very
limited extent that the district court may exercise judicial review over regulatory act proceed-
ings. 5 U.S.C. §§ 703, 706 (1970).
36 Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
37 Id. at 221, 224. The Carnation decision followed the suggestion of Far East, 342 U.S.
at 574-77.
38 See note 30 supra.
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of controversy primary jurisdiction reveals that the latter function is
more desirable than the former. If the supplementary function were
to be adopted, similar regulatory and antitrust remedies would
remain viable, and a prospective complainant would either have
both remedies available or would need to elect either the regulatory
or antitrust remedy. In the first case, the availability of both re-
medies can be criticized as, first, necessitating an awkward con-
struction of the intended impact of the regulatory act upon antitrust
legislation, and second, creating a double jeopardy situation. The
conclusion of awkward construction may be demonstrated by noting
that such construction renders unnecessary the regulatory remedy of
obtaining a cease and desist order from the appropriate regulatory
body, since the standard of proof is easier to meet in an antitrust
proceeding in which injunctive relief could be sought. 39 Likewise,
the conclusion of awkward coordination of the two enactments
would be supported by noting that permitting both regulatory and
antitrust remedies would have the practical effect of raising the
potential damage award under the antitrust laws" from trebled
damages to approximately quadrupled damages. Double jeopardy
objections would stem from subjecting an alleged offender to both
regulatory and antitrust proceedings in which liability for the same
conduct would be sought to be imposed. In sum, if similar regula-
tory remedies were held to supplement antitrust remedies and both
were available to a complainant, such an interpretation would lead
to double jeopardy and awkward construction objections.
Similarly, objections can be raised which pertain to the adop-
tion of the supplementary function in such a manner as to make
available either—but not both—the regulatory or the antitrust
remedy.'" Again, a strained statutory accommodation would be
created, and policy objections would ensue. The imposition of an
election of remedies scheme, .which is provided by neither enact-
ment, raises the spectre of awkward statutory construction. Fur-
thermore, permitting an election of remedies may foster a forum-
shopping situation comparable to that which was condemned in the
renowned decision of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 42 Moreover, since the
standard of proof would be easier and the rewards for success
greater in the antitrust proceeding, it is likely that the regulatory
" The antitrust laws impose liability for an attempt to monopolize or for actual
monopolization. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). In contrast, regulatory acts frequently require more
than a mere showing that the conduct is monopolistic, imposing liability if the offending
conduct is contrary to the public interest, considering other factors. See, e.g., § 14 of the
Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U,S.C. § 812 (1970); cf. Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747
(1973).
40 15 U,S.C. § 15 (1970).
4 ' This result was suggested by the Court in Carnation, 383 U.S. at 224. The Carnation
decision is the only controversy primary jurisdiction decision that has needed to consider the
impact of supplementary remedies. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
42
 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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remedy would never be chosen, a result clearly at odds with the
congressional policy interest in providing a regulatory remedy. 43
Briefly stated, a consideration of both the consequent statutory
coordination problems and the corresponding policy objections leads
to the conclusion that the supplementary function of controversy
primary jurisdiction is undesirable—regardless of whether both
antitrust and regulatory remedies are allowed or an election between
the two remedies is required.
In contrast, the replacement function, which would result in the
replacement of antitrust remedies if a similar regulatory remedy
were available to the complainant, appears to be appropriate."
Although it would have the harsh impact of constituting a pro tanto
repeal of the remedial provision of the existing antitrust law, such a
function would assure that the regulatory remedial procedures and
standards for rewarding relief would be followed. The replacement
function of controversy primary jurisdiction would thus assure the
fulfillment of regulatory policy established by Congress in enacting
the regulatory act. Accordingly it is submitted that the apparent
inconsistency in past controversy primary jurisdiction decisions with
respect to the appropriate function of that implied exception should
be resolved in favor of the replacement of antitrust remedies when
similar regulatory remedies are available to the complainant. 45
The third inconsistency associated with primary jurisdiction
—defining the proper test to be used in determining whether to
apply the doctrine—can also be resolved. When faced with the
problem of comparable regulatory and administrative remedies, the
Court has looked for additional criteria. In some cases, if an addi-
tional policy reason for invoking controversy primary jurisdiction
were found, the doctrine was invoked." More recently, the Court
has used an "identical standard" test and has invoked the doctrine
upon a finding that the standards of the regulatory act for awarding
the similar regulatory remedies are identical to those of the antitrust
laws.'" Since both of these tests require something more than the
availability of similar antitrust and regulatory remedies for the invo-
cation of controversy primary jurisdiction, both tests can be criti-
43 For a discussion of the conclusion that the standard of proof is easier to meet in an
antitrust proceeding, see note 39 supra. In addition, the rewards for success in the antitrust
proceeding are greater by virtue of the treble-damages provision in the antitrust laws. 15
U.S.C. 15 (1970).
" The availability of compensatory damages was suggested to be sufficiently similar to
treble damages to justify the denial of an antitrust complaint in Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry.,
260 U.S. 156 (1922). Similarly, the Court has invoked controversy primary jurisdiction
recognizing that a cease and desist order available under a regulatory act is a remedy similar
to an injunction obtainable under the antitrust laws. United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard
S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 485 (1932).
43 It would therefore follow that the appropriate disposition of a controversy primary
jurisdiction decision is dismissal, since the plaintiff's recourse would be through the apparatus
provided by the regulatory act rather than the antitrust laws.
" See note 30 supra.
4 See note 30 supra.
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cized. Whenever the tests would deny controversy primary jurisdic-
tion despite the existence of similar available regulatory and anti-
trust remedies, the result would follow that the regulatory remedies
would supplement rather than replace similar antitrust remedies,
and the objections to the supplementing function would be
pertinent. 48 In short, controversy primary jurisdiction should be
invoked to deny an antitrust claim whenever a remedial provision of
the regulatory act affords the complainant an opportunity to obtain
such similar relief. Controversy primary jurisdiction would thus
comprise an implied antitrust exception, implying the pro tanto
repeal of antitrust laws to the extent of similar available regulatory
remedies.
3. Prior Approval Immunity
Another argument that can be made in support of an im-
plicit exception to the antitrust laws is that of prior approval
immunity, which arises when the particular activities for which
antitrust liability is sought to be imposed have been approved by an
administrative body under the standards of a regulatory act. When
the legislative history of the regulatory act has not precluded the
argument,49
 prior approval immunity has been found to the extent
that the transaction causing the antitrust plaintiff's injury has been
approved by the administrative body under its regulatory act
mandate. 5 ° Underlying the prior approval immunity argument is the
48 See text at notes 39-43 supra. Further, the particular factors examined by the Court in
its decisions are subject to criticism. See Conviiser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its
Rationalizations, 65 Yale L.J. 315, 322, 329-30 (1956).
It may be contended that the recently developed identical standard test, first invoked in
California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962), is particularly objectionable, since this test arguably
denies the possibility that Congress may have intended that certain conduct be adjudged
under the more lenient standards of the regulatory act in recognition of a national policy other
than free competition. See note 3 supra. This problem is illustrated by an analysis of United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). See Kintner & Hanson, A Review of
The Law of Bank Mergers, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 213, 231 n.105, 233 n.117 (1972),
Notwithstanding the criticisms applicable to the identical standard test, at least one
commentator has suggested that test as the determinative factor in invoking controversy
primary jurisdiction. See Comment, Antitrust Immunity of the National Association of
Securities Dealers Under the Maloney Act, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 111, 129 n,117
(1972).
49 The Supreme Court twice denied a prior approval immunity claim when it found that
the legislative history of the regulatory act clearly indicated that the administrative agency's
approval was not intended to confer antitrust immunity. See United States v. Radio Corp. of
America, 358 U.S. 334, 344 (1959); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963).
59 The prior approval immunity argument was first recognized in Keogh v. Chicago &
Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), and later clarified in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S.
439 (1945). Though the Keogh Court applied traditional controversy primary jurisdiction
analysis to reach the result that the sole remedial forum for a party claiming injury from
unreasonable charges was that of a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the Court suggested an alternate ground for its decision by questioning rhetorically, "[M]ay it
be assumed that Congress intended to give . .. a[n] [antitrust] remedy, where, as here, the
rates complained of have been found by the Commission to be legal . . . ?" 260 U.S. at 162.
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assumption that Congress intended that administrative approval
under the procedures and standards of a regulatory act should have
some meaning." If an administrative agency approves a transaction
as consistent with a broad standard under the regulatory act
—considering all factors, including the transaction's anticompetitive
impact—the transaction should be permitted. Should an antitrust
court impose liability for the approved transaction, the prior ap-
proval by the administrative agency would have been meaningless.
Like the controversy primary jurisdiction claim, prior approval
immunity differs from pervasive regulation, in that the latter asserts
a total repeal of the antitrust laws to the extent of the scope of the
regulatory act, while the former argument asserts only a pro tanto
repeal and admits that the antitrust laws may have some application
to the regulated industry. In addition, the prior approval immunity
argument is by definition available only where the regulatory
scheme includes a supervisory administrative body.
4. The Silver Implied Exception
A fourth implied antitrust exception, derived from the noted
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange 52 decision, does not depend
upon a regulatory scheme involving a supervisory administrative
body. The Silver implied exception maintains that a regulatory act
expressing the policy of industry self-regulation should command an
antitrust exception just as a similar enactment providing for
specialized governmental regulation commands special treatment.
The Court thus suggested the basis for prior approval immunity: since the conduct against
which antitrust complaint was made had been approved by a regulatory agency with the
specific duty of regulating the conduct in question, the judgment of that agency should
prevail.
In the Pennsylvania R.R. decision the Court clarified the prior approval immunity claim
by indicating the extent of the immunity conferred by an administrative agency's prior
approval. Plaintiff state sought to file a bill of complaint under the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction, seeking both damages and injunctive relief from alleged participants in a con-
spiracy to fix arbitrary and non-competitive railroad rates to the detriment of shippers within
the state and to the advantage of shippers in the northern part of the country. The Court
noted that plaintiff Georgia could not maintain a suit for damages to set aside what it felt
were unreasonable rates because, under the principle of the Keogh decision, the conduct for
which antitrust relief was sought (railroad rates) had been approved by the appropriate
regulatory body. 324 U.S. at 453. However, the Court did permit Georgia to seek injunctive
relief under the antitrust laws from the alleged conspiracy to discriminate against Georgia
shippers. The result in the Pennsylvania R.R. case suggests that prior approval immunity
extends only as far as the administrative body has approved the transaction for which
antitrust liability is sought to be imposed.
51
 The rationale for prior approval immunity does not apply where the regulatory
standards to be considered by the administrative body are narrow and do not encompass
competitive considerations. If, for example, an administrative body must determine only
whether a party is technically competent to engage in an enterprise, that finding of compe-
tence will not be rendered meaningless by a subsequent antitrust decision ordering that party
to stop engaging in the enterprise. On the other hand, prior approval immunity would
properly flow from an administrative decision that a party's engaging in an enterprise will be
in the public interest, considering the impact of many factors.
52 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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According to the Silver decision, exception to the antitrust laws
should be implied for all actions taken by the self-regulated parties,
to the extent justifiable by the purposes of self-regulation." As
indicated in the Silver opinion, the Silver self-regulatory exception is
applicable only: first, where Congress has enacted regulatory legisla-
tion designed to encourage industry self-regulation, 54 and second,
where there is no supervisory regulatory body with powers of en-
forcement over the particular issue sought to be brought before the
antitrust court. 55
The parameters of the Silver exception have not been charted
by judicial development of the doctrine. All that is thus far certain
about the doctrine is that which was decided in Silver: a self-
regulated industry's actions which deny an injured party notice and
hearing cannot be justified by the goal of self-regulation and such
actions thereby subject the industry to antitrust sanctions. Since the
self-regulatory situation is rather unique, it is not surprising that
there has been no further development of this implied exception's
parameters.
The Silver implied exception can be distinguished from other
implied exception arguments. It differs from the primary jurisdiction
and prior approval immunity exceptions, in that it is applicable only
when the regulatory act fosters a policy of self-regulation and does
not grant a supervisory administrative body the powers to review
and enforce its decision on particular actions taken by the industry.
In addition, unlike pervasive regulation, the Silver implied excep-
tion admits to some operation of the antitrust laws on the regulated
industry. When industry conduct cannot be justified in terms of
self-regulatory goals, the Silver exception ceases to operate and the
antitrust laws apply.
To summarize briefly, this comment has thus far noted express
and implied exception arguments to the antitrust laws, distinguish-
'' Id. at 361.
'' Id. at 352.
55 Id. at 358 n.12. The Court stated:
Were there Commission jurisdiction and ensuing judicial review for scrutiny of
a particular exchange ruling, as there is under the 1938 Maloney Act amendments to
the Exchange Act to examine disciplinary action by a registered securities association
. . a different case would arise concerning exemption from the operation of laws
designed to prevent anticompetitive activity, an issue we do not decide today,
Id. On its face the Court appears to state that it simply is not confronted by and does not wish
to consider the applicability of the Silver exception under the Maloney Act amendments, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78o, o-3, q, cc, ff (1970). In spite of this, it might be inferred that the Court
intended to suggest that if the regulatory act creates a regulatory administration with jurisdic-
tion to scrutinize particular practices of the regulated industry (as in the case of the 1938
Maloney Act amendments), then the appropriate tests for antitrust immunity would include
the four which had been used prior to the Silver decision: (1) an express immunity provision in
either the regulatory act or the antitrust act; (2) a pervasive regulatory scheme implied
exception; (3) a controversy primary jurisdiction exception; or (4) a prior approval immunity
implied exception. This inference was not drawn from the Silver decision by another commen-
tator. See Comment, Antitrust Immunity of the National Association of Securities Dealers
Under the Maloney Act, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 111, 129, 131 (1972).
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ing between the different particular arguments. The controversy
primary jurisdiction implied antitrust exception noted above needs
further distinction from what will be called issue primary jurisdic-
tion.
II. ISSUE PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Having discussed the various antitrust exception arguments,
this comment will now attempt to distinguish one of those excep-
tions, the controversy primary jurisdiction implied exception, from
another use of the term "primary jurisdiction." The current dis-
agreement among commentators as to the function of primary juris-
diction will first be noted. In attempting to resolve the differences, it
will be suggested that the term serves two functions: first, as an
implied antitrust exception as noted above; 56 and second, as a
means of referring certain issues to an administrative body for its
consideration, which function will be identified as issue primary
jurisdiction. 57
 The comment will then discuss the circumstances
under which issue primary jurisdiction has been invoked, noting the
uncertainty surrounding the doctrine's use. Consideration will then
be given to the potential problems posed by the doctrine's lack of
parameters, and a rationale will be suggested which, if adopted,
would avoid those pitfalls. In concluding the discussion of issue
primary jurisdiction, this comment will suggest the appropriate in-
quiries to be made when considering whether to invoke issue pri-
mary jurisdiction.
A. The Current Debate
As noted by one commentator, an attempt to determine the
meaning of "primary jurisdiction" can be frustrating:
Less than two years ago, an eminent antitrust prac-
titioner characterized the subject of primary jurisdiction
and the antitrust laws as one enveloped in obscurity. Since
the [primary jurisdiction] cases . . . confirmed that gloomy
observation, confusion was compounded by the sanguine
comment of a leading administrative law treatise that "few
56 See text at note 28 supra.
57
 In some instances the phrase "non-exclusive primary jurisdiction" has been used to
refer to what is here called issue primary jurisdiction. See, e.g., Note, Antitrust and the
Regulated Industries: The Panagra Decision and Its Ramifications, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 593,
604, 611 (1963). The latter designation has been chosen by this comment because it is felt that
the former designation fails to adequately distinguish the two functions of primary jurisdic-
tion, since controversy primary jurisdiction cannot accurately be termed "exclusive primary
jurisdiction." See note 35 supra. Further, the term "non-exclusive primary jurisdiction" is
intrinsically inaccurate. Although both the court and regulatory agency decide some aspects of
the controversy, and, in this sense, the agency's role is non-exclusive, in some instances the
issue referred by the court to the regulatory agency can be decided only by the regulatory
agency, subject to review in an appropriate court of appeals. See 28 U. S.C. § 2342 (1970); see,
e.g., Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62
(1970). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1336(b) (1970); 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970).
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aspects of administrative law have been so systematically
and satisfactorily developed." 58
Some commentators, among them Jaffe" and Schwartz," recognize
that primary jurisdiction refers to an exception to the antitrust laws:
[Pirimary jurisdiction . . . may be thus summarized: judges
will not give relief against an unlawful restraint of trade if
there is a possibility that a subsequent administrative deci-
sion would approve the questioned activities. The pros-
ecutor or plaintiff is told to take his complaint to the
administrative agency whose jurisdiction is "primary." The
agency may then decide whether to approve the activities.
Judicial intervention will then take the form of appellate
review in the usual course, limited by the usual deference
to administrative expertise. 61
Briefly stated, these commentators use the term "primary jurisdic-
tion" to refer to what has been identified as controversy primary
jurisdiction, as evidenced by their beliefs that a plaintiff or pros-
ecutor is told to bring his complaint to the administrative agency.
On the other hand, other commentators, including Davis, 62
McGovern, 63 and Stokes," believe a contrary position is correct:
The precise function of the doctrine of primary juris-
diction is to guide a court in determining whether the court
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding
before the court. . .
The purpose of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
not to divide powers between courts and agencies but to
determine which tribunal shall take initial action. . . . The
reason for the doctrine is not a belief that an agency's
expertise makes it superior to a court; the reason is that a
court confronted with problems within an agency's area of
specialization should have the advantage of whatever con-
tributions the agency can make to the solution."
58
 Kestenbaum, Primary Jurisdiction to Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction: A Practical Ap-
proach to the Allocation of Functions, 55 Geo. 812, 813 (1967) (footnotes omitted), citing
3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 19.01 (1958).
59 Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1037 (1964); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction
Reconsidered. The Antitrust Laws, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577 (1954).
86 Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdica-
tion of Judicial Responsibility, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 436 (1954).
61 Id. at 464.
62 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 19.01, .09 (1958).
63 McGovern, Types of Questions Over Which Administrative Agencies Do Not Have
Primary Jurisdiction, 13 ABA Antitrust Section 57 (1958).
64 Stokes, A Few Irreverent Comments About Antitrust, Agency Regulation, and Prim-
ary Jurisdiction, 33 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 529 (1964).
65 3 K. Davis, supra note 62, § 19.01, at 3, § 19.09, at 53.
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In sum, it can be seen that this contrary position views the primary
jurisdiction doctrine as assisting, but not replacing, the court pro-
ceeding.
The two contrary views of primary jurisdiction can be recon-
ciled by noting that the term "primary jurisdiction" refers to two
different doctrines. As noted above, controversy primary jurisdic-
tion operates so as to remove a controversy from the jurisdiction of a
court under the theory that administrative remedies available to a
complainant replace similar available antitrust remedies. 66
In addition to its use as an implied antitrust exception argu-
ment, "primary jurisdiction" serves another function: courts some-
times invoke issue primary jurisdiction to refer certain issues arising
in a claim for relief to an administrative agency for resolution. In
contrast with controversy primary jurisdiction, when issue primary
jurisdiction is invoked the court retains jurisdiction over the con-
troversy, but refers one or more issues pertinent to the controversy
to an appropriate regulatory body. Consequently, issue primary
jurisdiction could not result in an antitrust exception, because the
power of the court to grant relief is not displaced by any concurrent
regulatory agency's power to grant relief.
Briefly stated, there are two different uses for the term "prim-
ary jurisdiction"—first, as a means of referring the entire con-
troversy to the regulatory administration as in its use as an implied
antitrust exception; and second, as a means of referring only certain
issues to the regulatory administration, with the court retaining
jurisdiction over the entire controversy. Accordingly, the apparent
conflict among the commentators might be resolved by noting that
Jaffe and Schwartz refer to controversy primary jurisdiction, while
Davis, McGovern, and Stokes refer to issue primary jurisdiction.
B. Issue Primary Jurisdiction Rationale
Issue primary jurisdiction has been invoked on several occa-
sions by the Supreme Court. 67
 The Court has consistently ordered
lower courts to refer certain issues to an appropriate administrative
body and to retain the court action on their dockets pending the
administrative determination when certain conditions have existed:
(1) the plaintiff has no means of securing from the administrative
agency relief similar to that sought in court; (2) the proponent of a
material issue in the case can invoke the jurisdiction of an adminis-
trative agency to resolve the issue; and (3) sufficient policy reason
has been found to have the administrative agency rather than the
courts resolve the issue in dispute." Despite the uniform circum-
" See text at note 31 supra.
87
 United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); General Am. Tank Car Corp.
v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940); Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 230 U.S. 247 (1913). More recently, the Supreme Court discussed a lower court's use of
the doctrine in Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic,
400 U.S. 62 (1970).
68 See cases cited in note 67 supra.
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stances surrounding its use, the rationale underlying issue primary
jurisdiction is obscure; even the Supreme Court has noted that "no
fixed formula" exists for its invocation. 69
The absence of underpinnings for issue primary jurisdiction
suggests that problems are likely to develop if the doctrine is used
either too sparingly or too frequently. Should a court fail to invoke
issue primary jurisdiction whenever the proponent can secure a
determination by an administrative agency—when, for example, it
exercises its discretion and finds insufficient policy reason to compel
referral—it would encourage forum-shopping. A litigant would have
the choice of having the issue resolved in an administrative proceed-
ing prior to bringing suit or otherwise merely commencing the court
action with the possibility that the court will determine the issue."
On the other hand, should a court apply issue primary jurisdiction
too frequently, other problems could ensue. First, a litigant might be
left without remedy if an issue within the subject matter competence
of an administrative agency was referred back to the agency and the
litigant had no opportunity to proceed before that agency. Similarly,
excessive use might result in the referral of an issue not essential to
the resolution of the law suit. In such an event, the court action
would be delayed so that an issue could be resolved which would
ultimately make no difference to the court's decision. The interests
of speedy justice would be frustrated and the energy of both the
referred party and administrative agency would be wasted. 71
It is submitted that a rationale for issue primary jurisdiction
may be developed to avoid the potential problems which derive
from both the too infrequent and overly excessive use of the doc-
trine. It might be assumed that Congress intended to replace a
party's means of obtaining a court determination of a particular
issue by providing that party with a means by which he could secure
an administrative decision. Should such a rationale be adopted, the
forum-shopping potential from the sparse use of the doctrine would
disappear, since referral to the administrative agency would always
be made whenever an issue's proponent could secure an administra-
tive determination. Similarly, the adoption of such a rationale would
eliminate one potential problem created by the doctrine's unfettered
use. A litigant would never be left without remedy, as the court
would never order a party to secure an administrative determination
unless that party could invoke the administrative agency's jurisdic-
tion.
To determine whether issue primary jurisdiction should be in-
" United States v, Western Pac. k.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
7° Though it is possible that a litigant might be able to select the forum in which he
wishes a particular issue to be decided, the impact of such a selection would be somewhat
mitigated by the appellate system. Ultimately, the various courts of appeals or the Supreme
Court could insure the uniformity of the law, regardless of whether a district court or
administrative agency made the initial decision.
71 For an apt summary of this problem, see McGovern, supra note 63, at 66,
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yoked it would thus be desirable for a court to inquire into whether
the proponent of the issue in question is provided a means by which
he can secure an administrative agency determination. In addition,
to avoid the final problem engendered by unrestrained use of the
doctrine—i.e., the referral of issues not material to the lawsuit
—inquiry should also be made into the materiality of the issue in
question. If its proponent is the defendant, it should be asked
whether the issue is an essential part of a valid defense. Conversely,
if the proponent of the issue is the plaintiff, the inquiry should focus
on whether the issue is an essential part of a valid theory of recov-
ery. In either event, if the answer is affirmative, the issue may be
properly deemed material, and issue primary jurisdiction would be
appropriately invoked. In such a manner, the distinction between
issue primary jurisdiction and its implied antitrust exception coun-
terpart, controversy primary jurisdiction, would crystallize, and,
with this clarification, the concurrent appreciation of the differences
between the several antitrust exception claims would smooth the old
wrinkles of confusion in antitrust-regulatory accommodation.
III. ANALYSIS OF RECENT CASES
The Supreme Court has recently decided three cases involving
coordination of antitrust and regulatory enactments. This comment
will examine each case individually, noting the Court's findings of
antitrust exceptions derived from express and implied regulatory act
mandates, as well as its use of issue primary jurisdiction. After
analyzing the three decisions, it will be submitted that the Court
departed from precedent in applying an express exception, failed to
clarify the several implied exceptions, and unnecessarily invoked
issue primary jurisdiction. Accordingly, it will be submitted that
further judicial clarification is needed to better integrate the anti-
trust and regulatory enactments.
A. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange"
1. The Ricci Holding
In the Ricci case, plaintiff, a commodities dealer (Ricci),
brought suit against the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Exchange),
several of its officers, Siegel Trading Company (Siegel), a company
similarly engaged in trading commodities futures, and Siegel's
president. 73
 Ricci claimed that defendant Exchange deprived him of
his exchange membership, required of all futures dealers by the
Commodities Exchange Act, 74
 by transferring it to defendant Siegel
72
 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
73 Id. at 290.
74
 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970). One section prohibits transactions in commodities futures
unless the dealings are conducted by a member of a board of trade, which board has been
designated a "contract market" by the Secretary of Agriculture. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1970). Another
section prohibits the maintenance of offices to engage in transactions prohibited by § 6. 7
U.S.C. § 6h (1970).
96
ANTITRUST LAWS
at the latter's request. 75
 Ricci claimed that Siegel sought and ob-
tained the transfer using a previously revoked transfer
authorization. 76
 As a result, plaintiff was excluded from trading on
the Exchange for a period of three weeks, until he purchased
another membership at a considerably higher price than his original
membership had cost. Ricci brought suit, claiming that the actions
of defendants violated the rules of the Exchange and the Com-
modities Exchange Act, and were pursuant to a conspiracy in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 77
The district court dismissed the complaint, accepting defen-
dants' contentions that the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 78 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first
determined that the complaint stated facts sufficient to allege a per
se violation of the Sherman Act, in that the alleged acts constituted
a group boycott. 79
 The court then considEred appellant Ricci's claim
that no exception to the Sherman Act could be inferred from the
provisions of the Commodities Exchange Act. Ricci used the Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange 8° precedent and argued that no
justification for the antitrust violation could be drawn from the
Commodities Exchange Act." The Seventh Circuit found the Silver
argument inapplicable. 82
 Rather, the court determined that the
power vested in either the Secretary of Agriculture or the Com-
modities Exchange Commission (CEC) was comparable to that of an
antitrust court," and therefore required that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction be invoked. 84
 The court then issued an order staying the
75
 409 U,S. at 290.
76 Id.
77
 15 U.S.C.	 1 (1970). See 409 U.S. at 290-91.
78
 Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 447 F.2d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 1971). The opinion of
the district court is unreported.
19
 Id. at 716.
"° 373 U.S. 341 (1963), See text at note 52 supra for an analysis of the Silver decision.
91 447 F.2d at 716.
82 Id. at 718. The Seventh Circuit there limited the availability of the Silver exception
argument to regulatory acts which provide for industry self-regulation without regulatory
agency review, and suggested that a different implied exception might properly apply in the
Ricci case. It has been stated that such a limitation of the Silver decision is appropriate. See
text at note 55 supra.
" Regulations promulgated under the Commodities Exchange Act provide a procedure
by which an injured party might challenge contract market trading requirements before the
Secretary of Agriculture or contract market rule enforcement decisions before the CEC. 17
C.F.R. §§ 0.3, 0.53 (1973). Under these provisions, any interested person can request the
Secretary of Agriculture or the CEC institute proceedings. If the requests are granted and
proceedings begin, any person may then intervene at the discretion of the administrative body
conducting the review. 17 C,F.R. §§ 0.8, 0.58 (1973). Without permission to intervene,
complainants have no legal status in the proceedings. 17 C.F.R. 0.3(b), 0,53(b) (1973).
The Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to invalidate any contract market rule. 7
U.S.C. 12a(7) (1970). Correspondingly, the CEC is authorized to issue cease and desist
orders to certain violators of the Commodities Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. § 13a (1970).
84
 447 F.2d at 718. The Seventh Circuit thus referred to controversy primary jurisdic-
tion.
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antitrust proceeding until the CEC or the Secretary of Agriculture
acted upon the case. 85
The Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit's determination
that the antitrust action should be delayed pending the administra-
tive action." In so doing, the Court applied a tripartite analysis: (1)
that the antitrust court would need to determine whether the alleged
activities came within an antitrust exception; (2) that the resolution
of whether the membership rules were• broken would materially aid
the court in determining whether an antitrust exception existed; and
(3) that the statutory jurisdiction of the CEC to determine whether
exchange rules were followed indicated that the question of whether
any membership rules were broken was one that should be con-
sidered by the CEC. 87
Following the Court's analysis, it can be seen that the Court
initially recognized that an antitrust exception argument could be
made. However, it was indicated that neither the pervasive regula-
tion nor controversy primary jurisdiction implied exceptions were
applicable. 88 Rather, the Court suggested that the Silver implied
exception might be applicable, noting: .
If the transfer of Ricci's membership was pursuant to a
valid rule, the immediate question for the antitrust court is
whether the rule itself and Ricci's exclusion under it are
insulated from antitrust attack. . . . On the other hand, if,
as Ricci alleges, loss of his membership was contrary to
exchange rules, the antitrust action should very likely take
its normal course, absent more convincing indications of
congressional intent than are present here that the jurisdic-
tional and remedial powers of the Commission are
excl usive 89
The Court thus suggested the Silver test, stating that the antitrust
exception claim would fail if the asserted conduct could not be
justified by the regulatory act. This statement thus connotes the
Silver antitrust exception argument, even though the Court did not
first inquire whether the purpose of the regulatory scheme was
industry self-regulation. 90
In the second part of its analysis, the Court indicated that a
CEC decision would be essential to a valid defense since it would
85 Id. at 720. The Seventh Circuit thus followed the suggestions of the Far East and
Carnation cases that the primary jurisdiction implied antitrust exception (controversy primary
jurisdiction) operates to delay, rather than replace, the antitrust proceeding. See note 37
supra. It has been submitted that sound policy considerations support the opposite
result—i.e., that controversy primary jurisdiction, when invoked, should deny entirely the
antitrust proceeding. See text at note 45 supra.
86 409 U.S. at 291.
87 Id. at 302.
88 Id. at 302 n.13.
86 Id. at 303-04.
90 See text at note 54 supra.
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resolve the Silver implied exception argument. The Court appar-
ently believed that if the defendant's activities were determined by
the CEC to be in violation of its rules, the activities could not be
justified under the goals of the regulatory act, and accordingly the
Silver exception would not apply. 9 ' Thus the determination by the
CEC would materially aid the antitrust court in considering the
antitrust exception argument, as a negative finding would eliminate
the Silver argument. Resolving whether the membership require-
ments were followed would therefore be critical to the outcome of
the lawsuit, and so would fulfill one of the necessary elements in
determining whether issue primary jurisdiction should be applied. 92
Furthermore, in the third part of its analysis, the Court deter-
mined that the issue was one that should be resolved by the regula-
tory commission. 93 The Court reasoned that since the issue of
adherence to the Exchange's membership rules was within the ap-
parent jurisdiction of the CEC, the issue should be referred. The
Court declined, however, to finally decide the issue of the CEC's
jurisdiction. "
2. Analysis of the Ricci Holding
The Court's decision can be justified on several grounds: first,
that neither pervasive regulation nor controversy primary jurisdic-
tion apply; second, that the Silver implied exception argument is
appropriately suggested to be used in the Ricci case; and third, that
issue primary jurisdiction should be invoked to have the appropriate
administrative bodies determine issues within their competence
which may be determinative of the proposed Silver defense.
The Court's suggestion that neither the pervasive regulation nor
the controversy primary jurisdiction arguments apply can be
justified in terms of both precedent and the provisions of the Com-
modities Exchange Act. The pervasive regulation argument has
never received judicial acceptance." In addition, the Court's result
in finding inapplicable the controversy primary jurisdiction antitrust
exception can be supported, although the method used to reach this
decision is subject to question. Since neither the CEC nor the
Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to award damages, which
was the relief sought by plaintiff in the antitrust court, and since
plaintiff does not have a statutory right to participate in proceedings
before either administrative entity, 96
 it is apparent that the con-
troversy primary jurisdiction exception should not apply. 97 Though
The Court indicated several times its belief that a CEC finding that the rules were not
followed would sound the death-knell of the possible Silver argument presented in Ricci. See
409 U.S. at 303-04, 306, 307-08.
92 See text following note 71 supra.
93 409 U.S. at 304.
94 Id .
See text at note 27 supra.
" See note 83 supra.
9 ' See text at note 48 supra.
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the Court reached this result, it did so on arguably inappropriate
grounds. Rather than questioning whether the appropriate regula-
tory body could -afford an antitrust plaintiff the same relief, and
rather than correspondingly inquiring whether a regulatory act gave
the antitrust plaintiff a right to participate in proceedings before the
regulatory body, the Court looked to other criteria. In so doing, the
Court followed the lead of the California v. Federal Power
Commission 98 and Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United
States 99 decisions, in obscuring the test for the implied antitrust
exception, by inquiring whether the administrative agency's review
would be "particularly focused on competitive considerations."'°°
Nevertheless, the result of the Court's inquiry—that controversy
primary jurisdiction does not apply—appears correct, even if the
validity of its foundation is debatable.
The Court's apparent determination that a Silver antitrust ex-
ception argument may be present is also supportable, despite the
fact that the Commodities Exchange Act provides for an administra-
tive agency with powers to review specific instances of exchange
rules enforcement. Accordingly, it can be argued that although the
Commodities Exchange Act permits the CEC to review specific
instances of Exchange rulings, a situation unlike that in Silver, the
Commodities Exchange Act still fosters the goal of exchange self-
regulation because neither the CEC nor the Secretary of Agriculture
are required to review Exchange actions. Accordingly, because the
Act grants both regulators discretionary powers to regulate, it can be
contended that it embodies a design of self-regulation akin to that of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 10 ' It would therefore follow
that the Silver argument is applicable.
The Ricci decision can also be supported in its determination
that issue primary jurisdiction should be invoked. It will be recalled
that issue primary jurisdiction should be invoked if a material issue
is raised in the court setting and its proponent is able to obtain a
resolution of the issue from a regulatory body. E 02 In the Ricci case,
the issue raised was whether the membership rules of the Exchange
were violated. This issue was found by the Court to be critical to the
plaintiffs theory of recovery, as the Court stated that the
" 369 U.S. 482 (1962). See note 30 supra for an analysis of the California case and its
departure from prior controversy primary jurisdiction tests.
99 371 U.S. 296 (1963). See note 30 supra for an analysis of the Pan Am case and its
adoption of the California Court's identical standard inquiry for invoking controversy primary
jurisdiction.
'°° 409 U.S. at 302-03 n.13. An appropriate test for the invocation of controversy
primary jurisdiction has been submitted. See text at note 48 supra.
"' 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b et seq. (1970). The provision of the Commodities Exchange Act
which enables the Secretary of Agriculture to take action against invalid Exchange rule-making
does not require the Secretary to so act against invalid rules. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7) (1970).
Similarly, the Act does not compel the CEC to issue a cease and desist order whenever it finds
a violation. 7 U.S.C. § 13a ('970).
102 See text following note 71 supra.
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Exchange's asserted Silver antitrust exception would "dissolve" if
the Exchange violated its own rules.' 03 In addition, the Court noted
that Ricci could possibly invoke administrative action to determine
whether the rules of the Exchange were broken.' 04
 In sum, because
the Court found that the question of whether the Exchange violated
its membership rules was critical, and concurrently found available
to the appellant a means of requesting administrative action to
decide that question, the Court's invocation of issue primary juris-
diction can be supported.
It is submitted, however, that several of the arguments pre-
sented in support of the Ricci decision on closer analysis do not
merit the result that the Ricci Court reached. First, Ricci's treat-
ment of the implied antitrust exception arguments is subject to
question. It is admitted that the Ricci Court correctly suggested that
the Commodities Exchange Act does not consist of pervasive regula-
tion so as to impliedly repeal in toto the antitrust laws in relation to
commodities exchanges. Further, it is likewise admitted that con-
troversy primary jurisdiction does not properly operate in the Ricci
case, as the Commodities Exchange Act does not afford plaintiff
Ricci any means of obtaining damages and therefore lacks a neces-
sary element of that exception.'° 5 However, the validity of the
Court's assumption that the Silver test applies is disputable, in view
of the differences in the statutory frameworks out of which the
Silver and Ricci cases developed. In Silver the Court found that the
regulatory scheme of the Securities Exchange Act contemplated
exchange self-regulation, as the SEC could not review specific in-
stances of exchange rules enforcement.' 06 Accordingly, it was felt
that the intent of the Securities Exchange Act was to promote
exchange self-regulation. Under the Securities Exchange Act, the
SEC is empowered only to punish an exchange if it appears that
the exchange has failed to enforce the exchange rule required by the
Act, which must prohibit violations of the Act.'" However, the
SEC is neither empowered to reverse the decision regarding en-
forcement of the required rule of the exchange,'" nor empowered to
review exchange enforcement decisions relating to other rules.'° 9
The Securities Exchange Act can thus be said to unquestionably
103 409 U.S. at 306.
"4 Id. at 304 n.14.
14" See note 83 supra for a summary of the regulations which provide for possible
complainant-instituted proceedings before either the CEC or the Secretary of Agriculture. The
denial of controversy primary jurisdiction is justified since a complainant does not have an
absolute right to proceed, under the theory that Congress did not intend to replace the
complainant's antitrust recourse, as evidenced by its failure to provide in the Commodities
Exchange Act such recourse through either the CEC or the Secretary of Agriculture,
1 " 373 U.S. at 357-58.
1 ° 7
 15 U.S.C. § 785(01/ (1970).
"K The SEC is empowered only to seek injunctive relief against threatened Securities
Exchange Act violations. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1970).
1 `1'4 373 U.S. at 357.
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foster a policy of exchange self-regulation. The Silver antitrust ex-
ception argument can therefore be limited by its facts to a regulatory
scheme in which the policy of self-regulation exists.
In contrast, the regulatory structure out of which the Ricci case
grew can be characterized as commonplace government regulation
without a view toward exchange self-regulation. In support of such
an argument it could be noted that, in contrast to the Securities
Exchange Act, the Commodities Exchange Act empowers the CEC
not only to punish the exchange involved, but also to issue a cease
and desist order whenever an exchange fails to enforce its rules.' 16 It
has been noted that the power conferred on the CEC is voluntary,
rather than mandatory, suggesting still that the intent of the Com-
modities Exchange Act was self-regulation," and it cannot be
controverted that this voluntary nature of the Act suggests self-
regulation. However, it can nevertheless be argued that the Silver
exception is inapplicable, in light of the fact that in the Silver case
the regulatory body—the SEC—had no power to review specific
instances of alleged rule-breaking, and that the Silver Court stated
that "a different case would arise concerning exemption from the
operation of [the antitrust] laws" if the regulatory body was empow-
ered to review specific instances of exchange enforcement. 112 At the
same time, the Silver Court suggested that if the regulatory body
had such powers the antitrust exception argument presented would
be that of controversy primary jurisdiction, involving the problem of
"coextensiveness of coverage with the agency's regulatory power.""
Hence, due to the difference between the statutory structure of the
Securities Exchange Act and the Commodities Exchange Act and
the suggestion in Silver that a case such as Ricci presents only the
potential argument of controversy primary jurisdiction, the unchal-
lenged assumption of the Ricci Court that the Silver implied excep-
tion argument is available is at least subject to question.
In addition, on policy grounds, the decision to extend the Silver
exception to industries which are regulated by administrative bodies
which are not compelled to invoke their regulatory powers is of
dubious merit. The Silver argument's availability might encourage
industries to avoid available, though not mandatory, regulatory
proceedings. Rather than seeking approval from which prior ap-
proval immunity could be claimed, a regulated industry might sim-
ply engage in the conduct, relying on the self-regulatory argument.
In this case, a regulated industry would be given a forum-shopping
situation. Accordingly, on policy grounds, the undiscussed sugges-
tion of Ricci—that the Silver self-regulation exception applies to
industries in which the regulatory body is not compelled to approve
or review the regulated industry's action—is subject to criticism.
II° 7 U.S.C. § 13a (1970).
t" See text at note 101 supra.
" 2 373 U.S. at 358 n.12,
113 Id. at 358.
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Even if it is assumed that the Silver implied exception may be
applied to the Ricci case despite the differences in regulatory struc-
ture and the policy objection, another objection can be raised to the
Ricci Court's decision. It can be argued that the Ricci Court sent
Ricci on a purposeless venture in invoking issue primary jurisdiction
to determine an issue in the regulatory agency which will be of no
help to the antitrust court. ' " 4 It will be recalled that the Ricci Court
assumed that if the CEC determines that the Exchange violated its
rules, the Silver implied exception argument would "dissolve," and
then invoked issue primary jurisdiction to have the CEC determine
whether the Exchange's membership rules had been violated.' 15 It
has been noted that the Ricci Court's decision to invoke issue
primary jurisdiction can be supported on the basis of the Court's
finding that the resolution of whether the Exchange violated its rules
was a material issue that needed to be resolved by an administrative
body—the CEC—which was possibly available to the appellant." 6
It is submitted that these contentions are without merit.
First, it is arguable that the determination of whether member-
ship rules were followed is not pertinent to the Silver argument and
that resolution of the issue is therefore unnecessary. In terms of the
Silver exception, all that needed to be resolved in the Ricci case was
whether the actions of the Exchange could be justified by a self-
regulatory purpose. The fact that the Exchange's actions violated its
own rules does not compel the conclusion that its actions could not
be justified as having a valid self-regulatory purpose. In short, all
that the CEC will consider will be whether the membership rules
were followed. Even if this issue were decided adversely to the
Exchange, the antitrust court will still need to determine whether
the rules violation could be justified by a valid self-regulatory objec-
tive. The issue primary jurisdiction referral will not contribute to
this later antitrust court decision and is therefore unnecessary.'" It
is therefore likely that Ricci's time, effort, and money would be
wasted by an unnecessary referral to the CEC.
Moreover, the invocation of issue primary jurisdiction in the
Ricci case is subject to further criticism, even aside from the fact
that the issue referred for administrative adjudication is not essential
to the decision of the antitrust court. The Ricci Court compelled
issue primary jurisdiction, despite the fact that the Commodities
1 ' 4 See text at note 71 supra.
115
 See text at note 91 supra.
116
 See text at notes 103-04 supra.
" 7
 The Court recognized that a decision by the CEC on the question of whether the
Exchange followed its membership rules would not determine whether the Exchange's actions
could be justified by a self-regulatory purpose—the prerequisite for the Silver exception. The
Court stated: "We make no claim that the Commission has authority to decide either the
question of immunity as such or that any rule of the Exchange takes precedence over antitrust
policies." 409 U.S. at 307. Nevertheless, the Court assumed that a finding that the Exchange
violated its rules would preclude an argument that the Exchange's actions served a valid
self-regulatory purpose. See id, at 304, 306-07.
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Exchange Act does not grant Ricci the right to proceed before the
regulatory body. Ricci must now apply to institute proceedings
before the CEC, as well as request intervention as a party. Either
his application for proceedings or his request to intervene might very
well be denied. In its reasoning the Court failed to recognize what
has been suggested to be the underlying rationale for issue primary
jurisdiction—that the doctrine responds to the policy implicit in a
congressional design which establishes regulatory bodies and pro-
vides parties access to those bodies to have issues resolved.' 18 Since
the Commodities Exchange Act does not provide aggrieved parties
the right to invoke the decision-making power of the CEC, it is
apparent that the reason for the invocation of the doctrine does not
exist. " 9 In addition, serious objections weigh against the invocation
of the doctrine. Aside from the additional legal expense incurred by
Ricci, delay in obtaining adjudication of his claim will be inevitable.
The delay may be needless, if the CEC refuses to institute
proceedings. 21 0 Yet, if the CEC instituted proceedings but denied
Ricci's request to intervene the result would be more objectionable.
As explained by Justice Marshall,"' if such a situation arises and
estoppel is later invoked to prevent the issue from being relitigated
by the trial court, ' 22
 then Ricci will be bound by a decision in which
he was not allowed to participate. This result suggests due process
objections. 123
 On the other hand, if the issue is relitigated, then the
referral process would have been a total waste of energy for both
Ricci and the CEC.
In sum, it appears that several aspects of the Ricci decision lack
justification. The applicability of the Silver implied exception is at
least questionable in light of the difference between the provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act and the Commodities Exchange Act
115 See text following note 71 supra for a discussion of the rationale underlying issue
primary jurisdiction.
9 Even a stronger indication that the reason for invoking the doctrine is not present
appears from the possible lack of CEC jurisdiction over the question. While noting the CEC's
apparent jurisdiction, the Court declined to finally decide that matter. See text at note 94
supra. Thus, Ricci is denied immediate court relief so that he can first request an administra-
tive agency to institute proceedings and permit him to intervene, even though it is possible
that the agency has no jurisdiction over the question referred to it. Such a result suggests
excessive application of issue primary jurisdiction. See text following note 70 supra.
120
 Justice Douglas suggested that the CEC will deny Ricci's petition to institute proceed-
ings, stating:
... [lit would appear to be an anomaly to direct the plaintiff ... to aln] . . . agency
for a determination as to whether the regulations which it is charged to enforce have
been violated, when the agency has, by its inaction, already shown every indication
of sanctioning the alleged violation. By remanding, we are requiring the petitioner to
seek from the regulators an admission of their failure to regulate (or negligence in
regulating).
409 U.S. at 308-09 (dissenting opinion).
Ill Id. at 312 (dissenting opinion).
' 22 See Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400
U.S. 62 (1970).
123 Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
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and the limiting language in Silver. Moreover, it appears that the
referral to the CEC for a determination of the question whether
the membership rules were followed is unnecessary to resolution of
the issues before the antitrust court. Yet, even if adherence to the
membership rules was relevant, the fact that Ricci did not have an
absolute right to proceed before the referral agency suggests that the
issue primary jurisdiction doctrine should not have been invoked.
In conclusion, the Ricci decision is subject to criticism on
several counts. Its result, in terms of the pervasive regulation and
controversy primary jurisdiction exceptions, is correct, although the
Court perpetuated the highly objectionable tests for the latter claim
which emerged without explanation from the California and Pan
Am decisions. The Court also suggested as applicable the Silver
antitrust exception. Finally, it invoked issue primary jurisdiction to
determine an issue that need not be determined in the antitrust suit,
even though the agency to which the issue was referred was not
available by the operation of law to the aggrieved party. Accord-
ingly, the Court failed to recognize sensible parameters .and the
underlying rationale for issue primary jurisdiction. Because the
Ricci case neither clearly limits the application of the Silver excep-
tion, nor shows appreciation for the relevant test set forth in Silver,
nor takes cognizance of the rationale underlying issue primary juris-
diction, the Ricci decision can be said to contribute to further
confusion in the application of antitrust laws to regulated industries.
Whether the other recent decisions clarify this area of confusion
shall next be considered.
B. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 124
1. The Hughes Holding
In the Hughes case, an airlines, Trans World Airlines, Inc.
(TWA), sought damages from its former controlling stockholder,
Hughes Tool Company (Too!co), and its president for alleged anti-
trust violations which occurred after the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) had approved Toolco's acquisition of TWA control. 125 TWA
alleged that Toolco had attempted to monopolize the aircraft supply
market during the period between 1955 and 1960, by requiring
TWA to boycott all aircraft suppliers other than Toolco, and by
conditioning its financing of TWA and sales to TWA on the re-
quirement that TWA not purchase or lease the goods of a
competitor.' 26 Prior to the trial, defendants moved for dismissal,
claiming that the CAB had primary jurisdiction and had approved
all the transactions alleged in the complaint.' 27 The trial judge ruled
' 24
 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
125
 Id. at 364-66.
126
 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 606 (2d Cir. 1964).
121
 In 1942, several events caused TooIca to fall within the ambit of IF 408 of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, .52 Stat. 1001, as amended, 49 U.S.C.
	 1378 (1970), which
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that nothing in the Federal Aviation Act precluded court jurisdic-
tion, and that the approval decisions of the CAB did not immunize
Toolco from antitrust liability. 128
Thereafter, Toolco refused to participate in discovery proceed-
ings ordered by the court, and default judgment was entered in
favor of TWA. 129 Appeal was taken, and the court of appeals
affirmed.' 3 ° The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and, after full
briefing and argument, dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted.' 3 ' The case returned to the district court and for nearly
three years the question of damages was considered.' 32
 In April
1970, damages were awarded in the amount of approximately
$145.5 million, plus interest. 133
 On appeal, the Second Circuit first
determined that the only issue to which collateral estoppel applied
was whether the cross-claim of Toolco against TWA was properly
dismissed on default.' 34 Then, reviewing TWA's claim and the
damage award, the appellate court affirmed. 135
 Toolco then ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, claiming, inter alia, that TWA's
complaint should have been dismissed because the supervision of the
CAB over Toolco's control over TWA conferred antitrust immunity.
upon the transactions. 136
The Court held that the lower courts had erroneously rejected
Toolco's defense that the transactions had immunity by virtue of the
surveillance of the CAB under the Federal Aviation Act.' 37 Without
considering any of the other arguments presented in the case, the
prohibited acquisition by a person engaged in aeronautics of control of an air carrier without
prior approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board. See 409 U.S. at 369-70. The CAB, authorized
to approve any such acquisition so long as the control "would not result in a monopoly . .
and thereby jeopardize another air carrier," 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970), approved in 1944
Toolco's acquisition of 45.6% of TWA's outstanding stock. Authorized by the same section lo
condition its approval, the CAB imposed a limitation of intercompany purchases and a
requirement for annual accounting to the CAB. 409 U.S. at 370.
Similarly, the CAB approved Toolco's increase in ownership of outstanding TWA stock.
In 1950, after reviewing the relationship between TWA and Toolco, the CAB approved
Toolco's acquisition of 80% of TWA's outstanding stock. Id. at 371-73.
1211 332 F.2d at 606. The trial judge thus ruled inapplicable the express antitrust excep-
tion contained in the Federal Aviation Act, which exemption provides in pertinent part:
Any person affected by any order made under sections 1378, 1379, or 1382 of
this title shall be, and is hereby, relieved from the operations of the "antitrust laws",
as designated in section 12 of Title 15, and of all other restraints or prohibitions
• made by, or imposed under, authority of law, insofar as may be necessary to enable
such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order.
49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970), formerly ch. 601, § 414, 52 Stat. 1004 (1938).
129 409 U.S. at 365.
1 " Id. at 365 n.l.
131 Id.
133 Id. at 391 (dissenting opinion).
133
 Id.
134 Id. at 365 n.l.
133 Id. at 365.
' 34 Brief for Petitioners at 65-66, Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409
U.S. 363 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners].
137 409 U.S. at 366.
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Court determined that the conduct charged in the complaint was
immune from the operation of the antitrust laws by virtue of two
antitrust exception arguments. 138
After noting that the Federal Aviation Act did not completely
displace the operation of the antitrust laws, the Court found an
applicable implied exception. With reference to Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. United States,'" the Court determined that
the previously exercised CAB jurisdiction over the events in ques-
tion created an implied exception to the antitrust laws.'" Taking
issue with the lower court's decision that the Pan Am case was
inapplicable,'" the Court found that the authority of the CAB first
to grant Toolco the power to control TWA, and second to investi-
gate and alter the manner in which Toolco exercised its control over
TWA, conferred antitrust immunity upon Toolco. i 42 The Court
stated that Toolco was excepted from antitrust liability because, as
in the Pan Am case, the authority of the CAB "pre-empts the
antitrust field."'" Despite its reference to the Pan Am decision,
which, it will be recalled, was decided upon controversy primary
jurisdiction grounds,'" and its use of pre-emption language, which
suggests a "pervasive regulation" claim , it is apparent that the Court
implied an antitrust exception in the hughes case on the basis of a
prior approval immunity claim, as it determined that the CAB
authorization and concurrent supervision of Toolco's control of
TWA removed Toolco from antitrust liability. 145
I " Id.
' 14 371 U.S. 296 (1963). The Pan Am decision is discussed in note 30 supra.
140 409 U.S. at 387.
'4 ' Id. at 380-81. The Second Circuit recognized that the Pan Am decision presented a
different implied exception, while the Supreme Court apparently failed to do so, The Second
Circuit found the Pan Am case inapplicable to the instant case, stating that "TWA's complaint
alleges transactions which are unrelated to any specific function of the CAB." 332 F,2d at 608.
The appellate court then distinguished the Pan Am case, finding two grounds for distinction.
Id. One of the grounds used was that the Pan Am complaint alleged matters that could have
been brought before the CAB, while in the instant case the CAB had no apparent means of
exercising jurisdiction over the matters in the complaint. Id. The Supreme Court, on the other
hand, took issue with the Second Circuit's other basis for distinction, and failed to appreciate
the different applicable implied antitrust exception arguments. Instead, the Court rested its
decision on prior approval immunity grounds, while likening the decision to the controversy
primary jurisdiction Pan Am decision by using broad "pre-emption" nomenclature. 409 U.S.
at 385.
142 409 U.S. at 385,. It has already been noted that CAB approval was required by the
Federal Aviation Act. See note 127 supra. The same section that requires CAB approval prior
to merger or control acquisition also permits the CAB to condition or modify its approval
order. 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1970).
141 409 U.S. at 385. Before reaching the conclusion that the approval and supervision of
the CAB conferred antitrust immunity upon Toolco, the Court first noted that the CAB
employed "competition and monopoly—two ingredients of the antitrust laws" as standards for
their approval. Id. This language, along with the statement that the action of the CAB
"pre-empts the antitrust field," raises the question whether the Court intended to apply prior
approval immunity or some other implied antitrust exception.
144 See notes 29-30 supra.
' 41 409 U.S. at 389. Besides enunciating its belief that the prior control and supervision
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Aside from the prior approval immunity grounds, the Court
invoked an expressly stated exception supplied by the Federal Avia-
tion Act. The Court determined that section 1384 (designated section
414 by the original enactment) expressly provided for the removal of
the complained activities from liability under the antitrust laws. 146
The Court found that both CAB decisions approving Toolco control
of TWA implicitly contemplated and approved Toolco decisions
regarding the source, conditions, and timing of TWA equipment
purchases. 147 Having found antitrust immunity, the Court re-
manded the case with directions to dismiss.'"
2. Analysis of the Hughes Holding
The Court's decision in Hughes can be supported both in terms
of its application of the express exception and in its determination of
prior approval immunity.
First, the express immunity conferred by section 1384 of the
Federal Aviation Act may arguably apply, if its prerequisites have
been met and its scope encompasses the activities about which TWA
complained. It will be recalled that express exceptions have been
applied only when their requirements have been meticulously fol-
lowed and the activities are clearly within the intended scope of the
exception. 149 It can be argued that the Hughes case passes both of
these tests, and accordingly the express exception should apply.
The prerequisites of the section 1384 express exception can be
argued to have been met, in that the CAB approved Toolco control
of TWA and the transactions by which TWA acquired aircraft from
Toolco. This argument assumes that the allegations of the complaint
charging intent to restrain trade and attempt to monopolize are not
admitted by default. 15 ° Accordingly, the only facts admitted by the
default would be the specified transactions between TWA and
Toolco, which, it could be contended, were implicitly approved by
the CAB in its decisions—first, to allow Toolco to acquire control of
TWA, and second, to allow Toolco to acquire additional TWA
stock. By so viewing the effect of the default, it can be contended
of Toolco's activities conferred antitrust immunity, the Court also reaffirmed its view that the
Federal Aviation Act did not displace the antitrust laws entirely. Id. The Court thus made it
apparent that prior approval immunity was the implied exception being invoked.
146
 Id. at 386. See 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970). For the text of the express exception, see note
. 128 supra.
147 409 U.S. at 386-87.
146 Id. at 389.
149
 See text following note 16 supra.
166 Both Toolco and TWA agreed that a default admits certain allegations made in the
complaint. Toolco, however, suggested that the allegations of intent to restrain trade 'and
attempt to monopolize are "conclusory" and should not be considered admitted by the default
under the rule that legal conclusions of the complaint are not admitted by the default. See
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 136, at 50. On the other hand, TWA contended that their
allegations of attempt to monopolize and intent to restrain trade were admitted by default, as
they represented "ultimate facts" rather than "conclusions of law." See Brief for Respondent
at 106-09, Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
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that the requirements of the express exception are met. Additionally,
the activities sought to be excepted can be claimed to be within the
scope of the section 1384 immunity provision, as its clear language
excepts persons from antitrust liability for engaging in conduct au-
thorized by the CAB. It can thus be asserted that, by determining
when and how TWA was to acquire aircraft, Toolco exercised
control over TWA—control that was authorized by the CAB and
excepted from antitrust liability under section 1384.
Support can also be produced for the implied exception argu-
ment used by the Court. It will be recalled that prior approval
immunity has been found when the specific activity for which anti-
trust liability was sought to be imposed had been approved by a
regulatory body under a broad regulatory act standard. 15 ' In light of
the prior approval immunity precedents, the result in the Hughes
case can be supported, as it can be contended that the CAB ap-
proved Toolco's acquisition of TWA control and effectively moni-
tored intercompany activities with its power to modify its necessary
approval.' 52 Accordingly, insofar as the CAB supervised the control
of TWA to assure its continued operation in the public interest
throughout the tenure of the Toolco-TWA relationship, it could be
argued that no antitrust liability could be imposed upon Toolco.
Underlying this argument would be the rationale that since the CAB
assured that TWA was managed in the public interest, TWA cannot
complain of injury from Toolea's control. For this reason, the im-
munity implied from CAB supervision of Toolco would extend only
to antitrust objections raised by TWA. 153 Accordingly, it can be
1" See text at notes 49-51 supra.
152 It has been noted that the approval of the CAB is required by the Federal Aviation
Act, which also permits the CAB to condition and modify its approval of any transaction. See
notes 127, 142 supra.
153
 This limitation on the extent of the antitrust immunity conferred by the CAB
approval and supervision is supported by a comparison to Georgia v. Pennsylvania R,R., 324
U.S. 439 (1945). In that case, the Court dismissed the antitrust complaint, insofar as it sought
damages allegedly caused by the design of railroad tariffs which had been approved by the
ICC. However, the Court found no antitrust immunity with respect to an alleged conspiracy,
and permitted the plaintiff to continue to seek injunctive relief against the conspiracy. See
note 50 supra. Hence, it can be concluded that prior approval immunity extends only so far as
the regulatory agency has approved the conduct for which antitrust liability is sought to be
imposed.
Correspondingly, in the instant case the CAB can be seen to have approved the control of
TWA, but not the subsequent transactions between Toolco and TWA which allegedly had an
anticompetitive impact on the aircraft supply industry. Although TWA might still be barred
from seeking antitrust relief by virtue of the CAB's continuing supervision of TWA, which
supervision assured that the airline was managed in the public interest, neither the federal
government nor other aircraft suppliers should be similarly denied antitrust claims, since the
CAB had not specifically approved the particular transactions in which Toolco exercised its
control over TWA, which transactions prevented the air carrier from obtaining aircraft from
other suppliers.
Moreover, even if the subsequent transactions alleged to create antitrust liability had
been approved by the CAB, it is arguable that neither the federal government nor another
aircraft supplier would be barred from antitrust action under the concept of prior approval
immunity. Because the CAB approval was limited in scope to the impact on TWA, and
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argued that the Hughes case reached the correct result on prior
approval immunity grounds. Thus, with reference to both implied
and express antitrust exception arguments, the Hughes decision can
be supported.
It is submitted, however, that closer analysis reveals that the
decision may be criticized. First, the express exception contained in
section 1384 is arguably inapplicable. Viewing the default judgment
as admitting the allegations of the complaint, i.e., that the actions of
Toolco were in furtherance of an anticompetitive design in the
aircraft supply market, it can be asserted that the requirements of
the express exception have not been met, since the anticompetitive
scheme and the acts in furtherance thereof are not "necessary to . .
do anything authorized, approved, or required" by a CAB order,
and therefore do not qualify for antitrust immunity under section
1384. Although the effect of the default was briefed by both
parties,' 54 and controverted in reply briefs and memoranda,'" the
Court never squarely faced the issue. To the contrary, the Court
assumed that the activities for which damages were awarded at the
damage hearings were the sole matters admitted by the default and
determined that the particular transactions were approved by the
CAB, thus possibly fulfilling the requirements of the expressly stated
exceptions. 156
 In other words, the requirements of the section 1384
express exception may not have been met, for the default judgment
can be viewed as admitting the anticompetitive conspiracy charac-
terization of Toolco's activities, which activities as elements of an
anticompetitive scheme were not necessary to do anything ap-
proved, authorized, or required by the CAB. The Court's reliance
on the express exception may therefore be considered misplaced.
More significantly, even if one assumes—as the Court did—that
the allegations of anticompetitive activity are not admitted by de-
fault, it is arguable that the section 1384 exception does not apply,
as the approval of the CAB, viewed in light of past interpretations
of express exceptions, did not extend to the events from which TWA
asserts Toolco's liability. The CAB approved only Toolco's acquisi-
consequently the air transportation market, it is arguable that such approval did not encom-
pass consideration of the impact on the aircraft supply market. Since the CAB approval did
not encompass these considerations, antitrust liability need not follow, as the CAB would
have considered only the narrow issue of whether—for the purposes of the air transportation
market—the transaction should be permitted, and had not determined the broader issue of
whether the transaction was in the public interest, all factors considered. See note 51 supra.
"4 See note 150 supra.
L55 See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 8, Memorandum for Respondent in Response to
Reply Brief at 5, Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
156
 409 U.S. at 386. The Court did not discuss precisely what was admitted by virtue of
the default, but did comment without further elaboration:
It is said, however, that ... the approval of the [Civil Aeronautics] Board did
not sanction the precise way in which Toolco allegedly used the power to the
disadvantage of TWA. But that is not an answer to the problem of exemption.
Id. at 379.
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tion of TWA control and several intercompany aircraft acquisition
transactions. Just as an earlier decision had limited an applicable
express exception, finding that the provision excepted agricultural
producers from the operation of the antitrust laws only to the extent
of per se liability and not for activities done thereafter with
others,'" the section 1384 exception could be applied in the Hughes
case to immunize Toolco from per se antitrust liability for the
acquisition of TWA and for the aircraft sales and leasing transac-
tions approved by the CAB. Not included in the scope of the
conferred immunity would be Toolco's use of control to prevent
TWA from purchasing aircraft from other suppliers and Toolea's
actions diverting aircraft to other airlines and delaying aircraft de-
livery to TWA. Since these actions were neither approved by the
CAB, nor necessary to do anything approved by the CAB, the
express exception provided by section 1384 arguably does not
apply.'" In sum, although it has been noted that the Hughes
decision can be supported in terms of the express exception con-
tained in section 1384, it is submitted that this exception is inappli-
cable because, first, the CAB did not approve Toolco's anti-
competitive design, the existence of which is arguably admitted by
default, and second, the immunity which section 1384 confers upon
Toolco should be limited to per se antitrust liability for control of
TWA and should therefore not encompass the exercise of that con-
trol so as to deny or delay TWA aircraft acquisition.
The Hughes decision is also subject to criticism for its treatment
of the prior approval immunity exception. First, it is apparent that
the Court's means of determining whether prior approval immunity
should apply is subject to criticism. The Court's reliance on the Pan
Am decision can be criticized as misplaced, since that decision was
grounded in controversy primary jurisdiction, as evidenced by the
finding of the Pan Am Court that the proceedings available before
the CAB replaced comparable antitrust court proceedings." 9 Simi-
larly, the Hughes Court's use of the identical standard test, wherein
it inquired whether the CAB applied the anticompetitive standards
of the antitrust laws in determining whether it should approve the
Toolco-TWA transactions, can be criticized as irrelevant.'" As this
comment has already noted, the identical standard test fails to
appreciate the possibility that Congress intended the standards of a
regulatory act rather than the antitrust laws to govern certain
' 57
 United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188 (1939). For a discussion of this decision, see
text at note 13 supra.
159
 This argument was raised by the CAB, an intervenor in the Hughes case. Memoran-
dum for the Civil Aeronautics Board as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973) thereinafter cited as Memorandum for the CAB].
159 See notes 29-30 supra.
's" For a discussion of the Court's prior use of the identical standard test, see note 30
supra.
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transactions."' To an even greater extent, the finding that the
jurisdiction of the CAB "pre-empts the antitrust field" is subject to
criticism.' 62 By phrasing the implied immunity in terms of preemp-
tion, the Court suggests a broader implied exception than is approp-
riate. The Hughes Court indicated that it did not contemplate a
pervasive regulation exception, but rather an implied exception to
the extent of the exercised jurisdiction of the CAB. 163 It has been
noted that analogy to previous decisions involving the prior ap-
proval immunity exception leads to the conclusion that the scope of
prior approval immunity would be limited to injuries allegedly sus-
tained by TWA during the CAB supervision of Toolco control.'"
Yet the use of the preemption language suggests that Toolco is
immune from antitrust liability sought to be imposed by parties
whose status was not protected by the CAB. The preemption lan-
guage suggests that either the United States or an aircraft supplier
would be precluded from seeking antitrust damages from Toolco for
the latter's alleged anticompetitive activities with respect to TWA.
Such a result would be unsupportable.' 65
To a greater extent, however, the Hughes decision engenders
criticism for implying antitrust immunity. Though it has been noted
that the use of prior approval immunity can be supported in the
Hughes case,' 66 it is submitted that this contention is without merit.
It was there contended that the CAB supervision of the Toolco-
TWA relationship generated prior approval immunity, insofar as the
CAB regulation assured that TWA was managed in the public
interest. On closer analysis, this argument has flaws. It can be
contended in full agreement with the CAB that they did not so
supervise the Toolco-TWA relationship.'" Moreover, as noted
above in criticism of the application of the express immunity provi-
sion, certain activities—among them Toolco's restraining TWA from
acquiring aircraft from other suppliers and diverting aircraft to
other airlines—were never approved by the CAB. In sum, it appears
fundamentally incorrect to imply prior approval immunity when the
appropriate regulatory body never approved the conduct in ques-
tion.
"I See note 48 supra. In addition, the use of the identical standard test permits the
coexistence of regulatory and antitrust remedies, and the consequent problems of forum-
shopping, disuse of regulatory remedies and double jeopardy. See text at notes 46-48 supra.
162 See 409 U.S. at 385.
161 Id. at 387-88.
I" See note 153 supra.
I" See note 153 supra.
166 See text at note 151 supra.
167 The CAB stated in its amicus brief that "we do not believe that an order approving
an acquisition immunizes post-acquisition managerial decisions under the antitrust or other
laws. The legality of such decisions must be determined on their own merits." Memorandum
for the CAB, supra note 158, at 11. The CAB then added that "none of the modification
orders in this case purported to sanction the antitrust violations found to have damaged
TWA." Id. at 11 n.11.
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To summarize, because the application of the section 1384
express exception was arguably incorrect, and further, because the
means used for implying antitrust immunity suggests overbroad
immunity, and finally, because the invocation of prior approval
immunity appears to be inappropriate, the Hughes decision is sub-
ject to criticism. Since the Hughes Court departed from precedent,
finding an express exception when the prerequisites had not been
met, the decision can be criticized as failing to clarify the principles
involved in regulatory-antitrust accommodation. In addition, the
same objection applies to the Hughes decision for its implying anti-
trust immunity. The .Court failed to clearly identify the prior ap-
proval immunity claim, using broad preemption language, citing a
controversy primary jurisdiction decision for support, employing the
questionable identical standard test, and finally, concluding that
immunity should be implied, notwithstanding the facts that the
CAB never approved the actions alleged to create antitrust liability
and that the CAB, by its own admission, never closely supervised
the Toolco-TWA relationship. It is thus apparent that the Court
departed from the principles of prior approval immunity and so
contributed to further confusion in regulatory-antitrust accommoda-
tion. Whether the principles of accommodation were clarified in the
third case recently decided by the Court will be examined next.
C. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States 168
1. The Otter Tail Holding
In the Otter Tail case, the United States brought a civil action
against an electric utility company, claiming that defendant attemp-
ted to monopolize the retail distribution of electric power in its
service area in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 169 The
series of events surrounding the charges commenced when
defendant's franchise for supplying electric power in four cities
terminated. At that time the citizens chose to establish municipal
power distribution systems instead of purchasing power individually
at retail from Otter Tail.' 7 ° Defendant refused to sell power pro-
duced by its generating facilities to the municipal companies, and
also refused to "wheel" (transfer electric power from one utility to
another over its transmission facilities) power to the municipal
companies. 171 Otter Tail relied on provisions in its contracts with its
customers which barred the use of its lines for wheeling power to
towns which it served at retail as an excuse for refusing to wheel
power to the municipal systems. ' 72 Two of the towns had access to
1"
 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
l" 15 U.S.C.	 2 (1970). See 41d U.S. at 368.
I" 410 U.S. at 371.
171 Id.
172
 Id. At trial the district court found that these anti-wheeling contract provisions were
added to Otter Tail's contracts at the power company's insistence and thus were not a
condition imposed by the purchasers. Id. at 379.
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other sources of power.'" One of the other towns built its own
generating station and requested the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) to order Otter Tail to interconnect and sell it power under
section 824a(b) of the Federal Power Act. 174 The fourth town even-
tually relented and renewed Otter Tail's franchise. 175
At trial, the district court found that Otter Tail had attempted
to prevent the municipal systems from taking root and had attemp-
ted to monopolize, and in fact monopolized, the retail distribution of
electricity in its service area.' 76 The trial court entered a decree
enjoining Otter Tail from: (1) refusing to sell electric power at
wholesale to existing or proposed municipal electric power systems;
(2) refusing to wheel power to such existing or proposed systems; (3)
entering into or enforcing any contract which prohibits use of Otter
Tail's lines to wheel power; (4) entering into or enforcing any con-
tract which limits customers to whom and areas in which Otter Tail
may sell electric power; and (5) instituting, supporting or engaging
in litigation against municipalities for the purpose of delaying or
interfering with the establishment of municipal power systems.'" In
addition, the district court retained jurisdiction to carry out the
decree or to modify any of its provisions.'"
Otter Tail took a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, under the
Expediting Act, 179 claiming that its activities were immune from
antitrust prosecution because the Federal Power Commission has
the authority under section 824a(b) of the Federal Power Act to
order involuntary interconnection.'" Otter Tail thus framed a con-
troversy primary jurisdiction implied antitrust exception argument,
173 Id. at 371.
174
 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1970). See 410 U.S. at 371. For the text of the pertinent portion
of this section, see note 180 infra.
173
 410 U.S. at 371-72.
179
 Id. at 368. The district court found that Otter Tail employed four principal tactics in
furtherance of its monopolistic goals; (1) it refused to sell power at wholesale to the new
municipal companies; (2) it refused to wheel power; (3) it instituted litigation designed to
prevent or delay the establishment of the municipal systems, which systems were financed by
bonds which could not be issued until the town's attorney submitted an opinion stating that no
litigation was pending which would impair the value of the bonds; and (4) it included in its
contracts with other power suppliers provisions against wheeling. Id. at 368, 372.
177
 Id. at 368-69.
178 Id. at 376.
179
 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970).
190 410 U.S. at 373. The section to which appellant Otter Tail referred provides;
Whenever the Commission, upon application of any State commission or of any
person engaged in the transmission or sale of electric energy, and after notice to each
State commission and public utility affected and after opportunity for hearing, finds
such action necessary or appropriate in the public interest it may by order direct a
public utility (if the Commission finds that no undue burden will be placed upon
such public utility thereby) to establish physical connection of its transmission'
facilities with the facilities of one or more other persons engaged in the transmission
or sale of electric energy, to sell energy to or exchange energy with such persons . .
16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1970).
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contending that the power of the FPC to grant relief replaces the
Court proceeding.
The Court rejected Otter Tail's contention, finding that the
authority of the FPC to order interconnection was not "intended to
be a substitute for or immunize Otter Tail from antitrust regulation
for refusing to deal with municipal corporations."'" In reaching this
conclusion, the Court noted first that antitrust standards did not
govern the FPC when deciding whether to order interconnection. 182
To further support its decision, the Court noted that the FPC was
not given broad powers over power companies, since the Federal
Power Act neither conferred upon the FPC the power to order
"wheeling" nor imposed upon electric utilities the obligations of a
common carrier.'" In sum, the Court found that the available
proceeding before the FPC did not replace the antitrust court pro-
ceedings, since, first, the FPC would not apply standards identical
to the antitrust court in determining whether to order interconnec-
tion, and second, the Federal Power Act did not comprise a "perva-
sive regulatory scheme."'" The Court then noted that the decree of
the district court was phrased so that it presented no actual conflict
with any decision of the FPC.'" In support of this view, the Court•
found that no conflict existed on record, since the FPC had issued no
contrary order with respect to interconnection." 6
 Further, the Court
suggested that such a conflict was unlikely, as the district court in its
decree retained jurisdiction over the case, and hence might amend
its order should any conflict arise.'"
2. Analysis of the Otter Tail Holding
The denial of antitrust immunity—asserted in a controversy
primary jurisdiction context—can be supported in the Otter Tail
case. An examination of the statute describing FPC powers reveals
no procedure whereby the United States could invoke the authority
of the FPC to order either interconnection or "wheeling. "188
 Accord-
ingly, since there exists no regulatory procedure which could replace
161 410 U.S. at 374-75.
182 Id. at 373.
183 Id. at 374.
1 " Id. The Court stated: "It is clear, then, that Congress rejected a pervasive regulatory
scheme for controlling the interstate distribution of power
	 ." Id.
185
 Id. at 377. Later in the opinion the Court reached several findings apart from
antitrust immunity claims. The Court determined that the allegations of the United States
were sufficient to state a per se antitrust claim. Id. at 378. In addition, it also remanded the
decision to the district court on the question of the appropriateness of enjoining Otter Tail
from sponsoring litigation to delay the establishment a municipal systems. Id. at 380. Insofar
as these issues are not pertinent to the implied antitrust exception claim, they are beyond the
scope of this comment and will not be analyzed.
186 Id. at 376.
a' Id.
IRS
 See 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1970). For the text of this section, see note 180 supra.
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the antitrust proceeding, the denial of the controversy primary
jurisdiction claim can be justified.
On the other hand, the Otter Tail decision is open to criticism
on several grounds. Objection may first be raised to the Court's
reasoning in denying the controversy primary jurisdiction claim. It
will be recalled that the Court denied the claim because the FPC
would not use the same standards as an antitrust court in determin-
ing whether to order interconnection and because the FPC did not
have a broad range of powers in its regulation of power
companies.' 89
 It is 'submitted that neither of these inquiries should
be given any consideration in determining the controversy primary
jurisdiction issue. As noted above, the identical standard test pre-
sumes the coexistence of regulatory and antitrust remedies, con-
comitantly creating forum-shopping, disuse of regulatory remedies,
or double jeopardy problems. 19° Moreover, the existence or non-
existence of broad powers vested in the FPC should have no rele-
vance with respect to controversy primary jurisdiction, which
should be granted if concurrent regulatory and court powers can be
invoked, no matter how narrow those powers may be. The "scope of
powers" inquiry would be used more appropriately to determine the
pervasive regulation exception—i.e., whether the regulatory act to-
tally replaced the operation of the antitrust laws."' Instead of
inquiring whether the FPC would invoke the same standard as an
antitrust court, or whether the powers given the FPC are broad in
scope, the Court might more appropriately have inquired whether
the Federal Power Act made available to the antitrust plaintiff the
means for securing similar relief through regulatory apparatus.' 92
Finding none, the Court would then be justified in denying the
primary jurisdiction claim. In such a manner, the Court might have
reached the same result, while recognizing the rationale underlying
controversy. primary jurisdiction.
The Otter Tail decision also triggers criticism for its failure to
recognize and invoke the Silver implied antitrust exception argu-
ment implicitly presented. It has been noted that the Court's deci-
sion not to imply a controversy primary jurisdiction is justifiable.' 93
However, it is here submitted that the failure of the Court to apply
another antitrust exception argument is erroneous, as the case pres-
ents the same type of antitrust-regulatory coordination problem that
was dealt with in the Silver case—namely, the extent to which
voluntary actions made under a congressionally mandated scheme of
self-regulation are subject to the antitrust laws. As in the Silver
case, in which the SEC had no power to review specific instances of
rule enforcement, the - FPC had no power to order wheeling,'"
189 See text at notes 182-83 supra.
190
 See text at notes 46-48 supra.
' 9 ' See text at note 21 supra.
192
 See text at note 48 supra.
193
 See text at note 188 supra.
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Congress having felt that "enlightened self-interest" would lead the
utilities to coordinate their facilities.'" As Justice Stewart noted,
"[the] legislative history . . . indicates a clear congressional purpose
to allow electric utilities to decide for themselves whether to wheel
. . . as they see fit." 196 Accordingly, it is submitted that since the
legislative intent was industry self-regulation in the area of wheeling
power, one activity found in violation of the antitrust laws—the
refusal to wheel power—should have been subjected to the Silver
test of determining whether the alleged violation could be justified
by legitimate self-regulatory goals. If, for example, the trial court
determined that Otter Tail had a legitimate self-regulatory
justification for refusing to wheel, no antitrust liability should attach
to that denial, and, correspondingly, "wheeling" should not be com-
pelled. On the other hand, if the trial court finds no legitimate
self-regulatory goal, but rather sham excuses offered to justify an
attempt to monopolize, antitrust liability should be imposed under
the Silver test. In either event, the Silver test should have been
employed, because the Otter Tail case posed the Silver question—to
what extent are voluntary actions made under a congressionally
mandated self-regulatory scheme subject to the prohibitions of the
antitrust laws. Because the Otter Tail Court failed to consider or
apply the Silver test, its decision to impose antitrust liability is
subject to the above criticisms.
To summarize, although the Otter Tail Court reached the cor-
rect result with respect to the asserted controversy primary jurisdic-
tion claim, the decision itself can be criticized. The Court failed to
recognize the rationale underlying controversy primary jurisdiction
and persisted in applying the identical standard, with its concomi-
tant undesirable policy implications. Additionally, it inquired as to
the scope of power of the FPC, thus invoking a test irrelevant to
controversy primary jurisdiction. Finally, the Court failed to note a
potential Silver argument, readily applicable to one aspect of the
case. By so failing to test properly the applicability of the con-
troversy primary jurisdiction claim and by also failing to note the
applicable Silver argument, the Otter Tail decision further contri-
butes to the obfuscation of regulatory-antitrust accommodation.
CONCLUSION
Since the first enactment of the antitrust laws, questions have
arisen as to the extent to which antitrust prohibitions apply to
194 It should be noted that the potential Silver claim in the instant case is limited to Otter
Tail's refusal to "wheel" power, since that activity alone was committed to self-regulation by
the Congress. Insofar as the FPC, in specific cases, could review a power company's refusal to
interconnect, the Silver argument is inapplicable. This limitation derives from the statement
in the Silver decision that the argument is inapplicable where a supervisory body has specific
powers of enforcement. See text at note 55 supra.
195 410 U.S. at 385 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
196 Id. at 386 (opinion of Stewart, J.) (footnote omitted).
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regulated industries. In several instances Congress has created ex-
press provisions in order to detail the interaction between the two
regimes. In other instances, arguments have been presented for
implying exceptions to the operation of the antitrust laws, some of
which the courts have accepted. In later years, however, the distinc-
tions between different arguments have become blurred. Moreover,
the policies underlying the implied antitrust exception arguments
have been lost in the passage of time and have been replaced on a
case-by-case basis with superficial underpinnings. Additionally, one
implied exception has become confused with a device for adminis-
trative referral. In recent months the Supreme Court has decided
three cases involving the application of antitrust laws to regulatory
enactments, and thus has had ample opportunity to refine the in-
teraction between the antitrust laws and regulatory acts. Instead of
doing so, however, the Court has contributed to the obfuscation
process. An analysis of the recent cases reveals that the Court
departed from established principles of express exception interpreta-
tion in Hughes, added to the confusion surrounding the rationale
underlying controversy primary jurisdiction in Otter Tail, failed to
appreciate the rationale underlying issue primary jurisdiction in
Ricci, needlessly invoked implied prior approval immunity in
Hughes, and made a shambles out of the Silver implied self-
regulatory exception by misapplying it in Ricci and failing to con-
sider it in Otter Tail. The three recent decisions mark a continued
alienation from the rationales underlying the several antitrust excep-
tions and the issue primary jurisdiction doctrine, and concomitantly
foster undesirable policy consequences. Therefore it is submitted
that judicial clarification of the principles governing the accommo-
dation between the antitrust laws and the various regulatory acts is
now needed.
GARY H. BARNES
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